Abstract: Many think that it would be wrong to defend an individual from attack if he competently and explicitly refuses defensive intervention. In this paper, I consider the extent to which the preferences of victims affect the permissibility of defending groups or aggregates. These cases are interesting and difficult because there is no straightforward sense in which a group can univocally consent to or refuse defensive intervention in the same way that an individual can. Among those who have considered this question, the dominant view is that that consent imposes only an extremely weak constraint on defending groups.
Introduction
Contemporary discussions of the ethics of defensive harm typically focus on cases of selfdefence, featuring two main characters: aggressors and their victims. The central question is to explain why victims are intuitively permitted to harm aggressors, given the usual prohibition on killing and injuring. The standard response is that, under certain conditions, individuals can render themselves liable to defensive harm and thereby lose their normal right not to be harmed. Debate centres on what the relevant conditions for liability consist in.
I will say almost nothing about liability here (in the cases I discuss I assume the aggressor's liability is uncontroversial). Instead, my topic is cases of other-defence. These feature an additional cast member: third-party rescuers, who are able to harm aggressors in defence of their victims. To date, the ethics of defending others has been relatively unexplored.
1 Of course, one explanation for this gap would be if the morality of other-defence were entirely determined by principles of self-defence. On this view, if it is permissible for a victim to inflict a certain harm on an aggressor, it follows that it is permissible for a third-party to do so in his defence. 2 If that's right, then there is no work for a theory of other-defence to do.
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One way to justify a theory of other-defence is by showing that there are sui generis constraints on defending others that do not apply to self-defence. In this paper, I explore one important candidate, endorsed by several theorists, which focuses on the victim's will. 4 The constraint is usually characterised as follows:
Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if those to be defended consent to defensive intervention.
Though this captures the central idea, the requirement is implausibly restrictive as stated.
For one, it implies that it would be impermissible to defend someone who is unable to consent, such as someone being attacked while sleeping or unconscious. 5 But we can easily revise the requirement to avoid such implications:
Consent Requirement*: Other-defence is morally justified only if those to be defended do not validly refuse defensive intervention.
Though rather unwieldy, this standard for consent should be familiar from medical contexts. For example, if a patient requires immediate treatment for a serious illness but is unconscious or otherwise unable to consent, doctors may proceed with treatment without 3 wronging the patient (provided she has not issued prior instructions not to be treated). 6 For ease of exposition I will continue to refer to the 'consent' requirement on defensive harm, despite 'the absence-of-valid-refusal requirement' being the more accurate label.
In contrast to other standard components of a theory of defensive harm -such as liability, proportionality, and necessity -that focus on the normative situation between victims and aggressors, the consent requirement draws our attention to the relationship between victims and rescuers. 7 It holds that it can be impermissible for a rescuer to harm an aggressor -and may even wrong the beneficiary 8 -even if the rescuer would commit no wrong against the aggressor. If defensible, the consent requirement establishes a moral asymmetry between self-and other-defence: the fact that a victim is permitted to harm their aggressor does not entail that third-parties may do so, since the victim may refuse intervention.
The central question I want to focus on is how the consent-requirement governs large-scale cases of defensive force, in which groups or aggregates of individuals are the object of defence. In these cases, many find an analogue of the requirement very attractive. When it comes to military humanitarian intervention, for example, it is often argued that intervention is permissible only if carried out with the approval of the intended beneficiaries. 9 But the point generalises to other contexts, such as the use of violence by non-state actors in defence of oppressed groups. The basic idea is that a belligerent group 6 This is roughly4 may only resort to rebellion, revolution, or insurgency if they have the support of the population they claim to be protecting. 10 More broadly still, we might agree with Yitzhak
Benbaji that in practically any defensive war, including wars of national defence, "groups on whose behalf the war is fought…are entitled to veto the war".
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However, despite its intuitive appeal, it is far from straightforward how we should apply the consent-requirement to these cases. The problem follows from an obvious disanalogy between individuals and groups. Collectives are not simply individuals 'writ large'. 12 Rather, they are composed of individuals, each with a will and moral status of their own. 13 Moreover, in any realistic case there is unlikely to be unanimity among the victims as to whether they desire defensive intervention. There is thus is no straightforward sense in which 'the victims' or 'the beneficiaries' can consent to ( What if only a tiny handful of the beneficiaries want to be defended while the rest are opposed? Each of these distributions has a claim to being the correct interpretation of the consent-requirement, but how do we adjudicate between them? Until we settle this question, we cannot properly assess the case for intervention. Interestingly, the cases in which the consent requirement is most intuitive seem to be those in which it tells us the least.
Put in more general and precise terms, examples like this raise the question of how a theory of defensive harm should respond to what I call multiple-victim cases. These have the following features:
(1) An aggressor threatens unjustified harm to several victims. (2) A rescuer has the ability to prevent the threatened harm by imposing defensive harm on the aggressor.
(3) Defending every victim is a condition of defending any.
14 (4) One sub-set of the members of the victim group consent to defensive intervention, another sub-set refuses.
In these cases, the consent requirement gives no guidance as to the permissibility of defence because it is indeterminate as to whether or not 'those to be defended' qualify as having consented (or, more accurately, as having not refused). To overcome this problem, the requirement needs to be supplemented with an aggregation principle, which tells us how we should move from the consent and refusal of individual victims to an all-things-considered judgement about whether or not the requirement has been met. My chief aim in this paper to provide such a principle. This is no easy task. Allen Buchanan has recently expressed doubts that it is even possible, on the ground that "there apparently is no principled way of determining how widespread consent must be for the consent requirement to be satisfied". 15 Moreover, even if a non-arbitrary principle can be found, a different source of scepticism arises regarding whether the principle has any practical significance. This is the dominant view among those who have considered the aggregation question. According to these sceptics, the consent requirement imposes only a trivial constraint in multiple-victim cases, one that will be satisfied in practically any real-world example. More precisely, the claim is that the requirement is met just as long as some member(s) of the victim group do not validly refuse defensive intervention.
My central thesis is that this scepticism is mistaken, and that a much more robust aggregation principle governs multiple-victim cases. Indeed, according to the principle that I will defend, there are cases in which the refusal of a single victim can make it impermissible to defend a larger group, even if every other member explicitly consents. Moreover, I aim to show that we can get to this somewhat startling conclusion without abandoning the basic commitments that underpin the sceptical position.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I provide some intuitive support for I term this the Power of Prudential Exclusion (PPE). In the context of defensive harm, the upshot of the PPE is that victims are able to constrain the reasons that rescuers can invoke in order to justify defensive intervention. If a victim validly refuses defensive intervention, the fact that defence will benefit him cannot be invoked by rescuers to justify harming innocents as the lesser-evil. When defending a group involves causing these harms -as in any realistic case of humanitarian intervention, revolution, or war -the refusal of victims serves to the reduce the goods that are available to justify the use of defensive force. An important implication of this view is that what constitutes having 'enough' consent from the members of a victim group is context-sensitive. It will depend on (i) how large the group of beneficiaries is, (ii) how many victims validly refuse defensive intervention, and (iii) the extent to which innocents will be harmed in the course of defending the group. To return to our earlier question of whether State A's intervention would satisfy the consent requirement if 70%, 20%, or 1% of the beneficiaries approve, my contention is that, until we flesh out these details, any of these distributions could be sufficient.
In Section 5 I consider an important objection to my proposal. The central thrust is that individual victims are subject to duties to rescue their co-victims, and that these duties place significant limits on their power to refuse defensive intervention. I argue that, contrary to first impressions, victims are not obligated to assist their co-victims by consenting to defensive harm in the relevant cases. In fact, they have no moral reason to do so at all. Their power to refuse therefore remains unconstrained. I conclude in Section 6 by demonstrating some of the wider practical implications of my account, focussing on the case of political protest.
Support for the Consent Requirement*
To help see the appeal of the consent requirement, consider the following single-victim case:
Elevator 1: Victim is taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victim and wishes him dead.
Rescuer is walking by and is able to shoot Aggressor with her sniper rifle, thereby saving Victim. However, Victim refuses intervention because he is deeply committed to non-violence.
In cases like this, many think that it would be morally impermissible for Rescuer to defend Victim (on the assumption that Victim has sufficient information, is not irrational, is not being coerced, etc.). 16 The underlying idea is that victims occupy a privileged position within 18 It might be objected that appealing to anti-paternalist intuitions in order to support the consentrequirement is a mistake, because paradigmatic cases of paternalism have features that are lacking in cases like Elevator 1. For example, one might take paternalism to involve, (i) second-guessing the paternalisee's judgement about what is good for them, (ii) acting due to doubts about the paternalisee's having the required willpower to stick to their resolutions, and/or (iii) violating some independent claim of the paternalisee, such as their rights to bodily integrity or property. However, even if these are common features of paternalism, they are not plausibly necessary conditions, as the following two cases show:
Experiment: Benny freely and competently decides take part in a medical experiment that will make a major contribution to finding a cure for a serious genetic disease (which Benny does not have). The experiment has serious side-effects that will reduce Benny's life expectancy by one year. There is no compensation available for participants in the experiment. Out of concern for Benny's welfare, Sally locks Benny in his house so he misses the experiment.
Chocolate:
Tony is an expert in nutrition who enjoys eating fatty foods, and chocolate in particular. He is fully aware that his diet is unhealthy and will cause him a premature death, but freely and competently decides that he prefers gustatory pleasures over an increased lifespan, and resolves to live a shorter life full of chocolatey bliss. Out of concern for Tony's welfare, Sally buys all the chocolate from every shop in Tony's hometown in order to stop him from purchasing any.
I take it that Sally clearly acts paternalistically (and impermissibly) in both these cases. But in Experiment there is no disagreement between Sally and Benny about whether his choice would be good for him. Participating in the experiment would obviously be bad for him, but he has chosen to sacrifice his welfare for nonprudential reasons (the good of others To endorse the consent requirement, all one need accept is that (i) interference with at least some self-regarding choices for the sake of the chooser's good is prohibited, and (ii) that this includes at least some choices not to be defended by others. Of course, a complete account of the requirement will need to take a stand on what distinguishes valid from invalid refusal. But, for our purposes, we need not settle this here, since the question of determining the correct aggregation principle is independent of which particular package of procedural and content-based constraints one accepts. (In Section 5 I will consider a special kind of validity condition -neither procedural nor content-basedwhich is not independent in this way). Given these fairly minimal commitments, one need I assume that Aggressor remains liable to defensive killing in all three examples. But I take it that even the sceptical reader will feel the intuitive pull of the consent requirement in at least some of these cases. Moreover, the additional factors introduced above will be present in many real-world multiple-victim cases. For example, excused aggressors are fairly ubiquitous in armed conflicts, since many combatants who participate in unjust wars possess partial excuses for doing so, due to immaturity, ignorance, or duress. Similarly, non-lethal aggressors are present in cases of so-called 'bloodless invasion', in which the invader's aims only involve imposing non-lethal harms on their victims, such as territorial annexation and political repression (lethal force will only be employed if resistance is met.) Admittedly, the case of special relationships does not generalise so straightforwardly (though it would still clearly hold in cases where one family member attacks several others). But it may still plausibly apply in cases of intra-state violence, where oppressors and oppressed are often specially related to one another, albeit by non-familial bonds. So, even if victim refusal is only morally effective when these factors are in play, this does not significantly restrict the practical application of the consent-requirement, nor make the search for an aggregation principle any less pressing. 22 Lazar, 'Authorisation and the Morality of War', 216-218. 23 Ibid., p.217. Lazar accepts that something like the consent requirement may apply in a limited range of cases, in which killing is justified on the basis of agent-relative reasons, such as those grounded in special relationships. However, the existence of these justifications is highly contested.
However, this isn't a convincing argument, for three reasons. First, the view that it is impermissible to defend victims against their will need not rest on the claim that their refusal "negates the agent-neutral value of saving their life", as Lazar puts it. 24 Rather, the most natural interpretation of the idea is that refusal generates a new moral consideration against defending them that defeats the agent-neutral, welfare-based reasons in favour. This would be a paradigmatic case of wrongful paternalism. 
Scepticism About Consent in Multiple-Victim Cases
The dominant view among theorists who have considered these cases is that consent imposes little, if any, independent constraint on defensive harm. This scepticism is typically defended in opposition to a natural proposal (often made in discussions of humanitarian intervention and the use of force by non-state actors 30 ) which calls for a majoritarian aggregation principle. More specifically:
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The Majority Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if a majority (or super-majority) of the members of the victim group consent to defensive intervention (or do not validly refuse).
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This view has obvious appeal. After all, few dispute that democracy is a good thing. In many contexts majority rule seems the appropriate way of deciding how to proceed given disagreement. The problem, however, is that when it comes to defending basic interestssuch as life and limb -the majoritarian proposal is far from intuitive. To demonstrate, consider the following case, based on an example of Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman's 32 :
Elevator 2: Five Victims are taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victims and wishes them dead.
Rescuer is walking by and is able to shoot Aggressor with her sniper rifle, thereby saving the Victims. However, while one Victim consents to Defender's intervention, the four remaining Victims refuse because of their deep commitment to non-violence.
Here defence seems clearly permissible, despite the fact that 80% of the victims explicitly refuse. Moreover, the intuition persists even if we specify that the victims share a special relationship, such as family membership. These verdicts track the powerful idea that individuals' basic interests place limits on majority rule. 33 When these interests are threatened, individuals may have the right to decide for themselves whether they are defended, but not to decide for others. 34 As Altman and Wellman put it, "It seems dubious to hold that a group has this type of normative dominion over its members." 35 As in the case of Elevator 1, the value of individual sovereignty seems to ground the intuitive verdict. This is consistent with consent playing an important derivative role in justifying otherdefence. For example, widespread refusal may provide good evidence that defence would not be justified on some other ground, or render intervention unlikely to succeed (for example, because success requires the cooperation of the victims). 40 The sceptics' position is that consent imposes only a trivial independent constraint on intervention in multiplevictim cases.
In Defence of Consent
In what follows I provide a defence of the consent requirement against this scepticism. As my starting points, I accept the intuitive verdicts in both Elevator 1 and Elevator 2 and the sceptics' rejection of the Majority Consent Requirement. I also accept the deeper liberal/individualist picture of morality that underpins -either explicitly or implicitly -the sceptical position. But I will deny the Minimal Consent Requirement follows from these judgements. Instead, we should endorse a much stronger aggregation principle, according to which defending a group can be impermissible in virtue of a single victim refusing defensive intervention.
The power to control one's good
I start by providing a deeper moral basis for the consent requirement, that provides a unified explanation of the contrasting verdicts in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2.
Here is the basic idea. When it comes to our bodies and property, each of us has the moral power to exclude others from using them, simply because they are ours and we are in charge of them. Others may only use our material resources if we authorise them to do so and we are wronged if they do so without our consent, even if they improve those resources by using them. 41 My contention is that, in addition to these more prosaic rights, each of has structurally similar powers of control regarding whether, and for what purposes, others may use our good. One person uses another's good when she justifies her actions by appeal to the fact that it will promote the other's welfare. On this view, reasons pertaining to an individual's good can be thought of as a kind of resource -a moral resource. And just as I can exclude you from using my body or property by withholding my consent, I have the power to prevent you from justifying your actions by appealing to the fact that you will benefit me, by repudiating those benefits. By exercising this power, I
render my good morally inadmissible for the purposes of justifying your action, and you commit a form of trespass against me if you attempt to do so. For want of a convenient label, term this normative ability the Power of Prudential Exclusion (PPE). 42 An important upshot of the PPE is that individuals can, by controlling access to justifying reasons, render actions impermissible that would otherwise be justified. As I will explain below, it is this consequence of our self-regarding powers that gives the consent requirement its moral foundations.
But some further work needs to be done first. What I have said so far simply sets out the structural features of the PPE. But why should we think that individuals have this
power? And what grounds or justifies it?
In my view, the most compelling evidence for the PPE comes from noting the central role it plays -either explicitly or implicitly -in prominent accounts of paternalism's distinctive wrongness, as well as in explaining judgements about particular cases. 43 I will not attempt to offer a definition of paternalism. 44 Instead, I will (rather roughly) take 42 While preparing the final version of this paper, I became aware of a very similar proposal defended in unpublished work by Seth Lazar. Lazar also argues that your rights of self-ownership extend to your interests, and that one important upshot of these rights is that "whether those interests count for or against some action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice." However, Lazar deploys this idea for different purpose to mine. Whereas I focus on the implications of our rights over our good for how others may permissibly act, Lazar is concerned with how these rights affect the deontic status of our own actions. In particular, Lazar argues that these ownership rights ground agent-centred options to favour and sacrifice one's own interests, even when doing so does not promote aggregate wellbeing. Seth Lazar, 'Self-Ownership and Agent-Centred Options' (unpublished manuscript). I briefly discuss some of Lazar's arguments for the general right below. 43 If Lazar is correct that positing the right to control how one's interests may be used grounds central features of commonsense morality, then this provides another source of support for something like the PPE. (ii) that is carried out against her will, and (iii) for the sake of her own good. On a fairly standard conception, paternalism is wrong (when it's wrong) because the paternalisee's autonomy has priority over considerations of her wellbeing or good. The question is how to characterise this priority. According to one influential view, we should understand it in terms of competent individuals having authority with respect to their good. 45 When it comes to matters concerning her own welfare, the individual is 'the boss' and her will settles the question of whether others may act to promote her good. The paternalistic wrong lies in denying individuals rightful authority over themselves. By contrast, paternalism may be permissible when one's self-regarding authority is compromised in some way (for example, due to duress, deception, or lack of capacity). An important virtue of authority-accounts of paternalism -and therefore the PPE -is that they enable us to explain the intuitive difference between cases like the following 48 :
Medicine 1: Bob is ill and will die unless he takes some medicine that is delivered via a gas. However, he competently refuses medical treatment because the medicine contains a substance that his religious convictions prohibit ingesting. Doctor pumps the gas into Bob's hospital room in order to save his life. Bob breaths the gas.
Medicine 2: Dave is ill and will imminently develop a lifelong debilitating condition unless he takes some medicine that is delivered via a gas. He consents to Doctor giving him the medicine. However, due to time constraints, the only way to treat him is to immediately pump the gas into Dave's hospital ward. Bob is the hospital bed next to Dave recovering from a slipped disc, which has rendered him immobile. Bob refuses to be given the medicine because the medicine contains a substance that his religious convictions prohibit ingesting. The cost to Bob of breathing the gas is sufficiently high that he is not under a duty to bear it in order to save Dave the cost of the debilitating disease. Doctor pumps the gas into the ward in order to save Dave from the debilitating condition. Both Bob and Dave breath the gas.
I assume it would clearly be wrongfully paternalistic for Doctor to force Bob to consume the gas against his will in Medicine 1 (this is simply the Patient case with slightly different apparatus). In Medicine 2, by contrast, it would not be paternalistic, and may well be morally permissible for Doctor to do so (at very least, there seems to be a significant moral difference between the two cases). This comparison reveals, interestingly, that it can be permissible to transgress an individual's rights to autonomy and bodily integrity in order to promote the good (preventing the harm of a debilitating disease), yet impermissible to violate those very same rights in order bring about a greater good (preventing the harm of death). The PPE neatly explains how this can be so. What matters is not simply how much wellbeing is promoted, but whose wellbeing it is and whether they have exercised their powers of control over it. While we may not transgress Bob's rights for the sake of Bob's good (because he has excluded us from appealing to those reasons), we may do so for the sake of Dave's lesser good because those reasons remain 'in play' and may be sufficient to justifying overriding Bob's rights as the lesser-evil.
Moving on to the justification of the PPE. I believe the PPE can be grounded in a plurality of considerations. A complete account of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, let me briefly sketch five promising candidates.
First, and most obviously, the PPE responds to the fact that we are intimately and uniquely connected to our own good, perhaps even more so than our own bodies. As Seth
Lazar argues, we are not only affected by the satisfaction and frustration of our interests as no one else can be, they also play a central role in constituting our identity: there is a sense in which we just are our interests. 49 Given the degree to which we are enmeshed with our own wellbeing, it seems fitting that we have rights to control how others may use it, just as we have rights over what others may do with our bodies.
Second, the PPE serves our interest in autonomy, in at least two ways. First, our having the ability to prevent others from acting to promote our good enhances our ability to shape our lives in accordance with values and projects that we endorse (autonomy as self-determination or authenticity). Second, by giving us control over the reasons for which others may act, the PPE protects our interest in not being controlled by others (autonomy as independence). In each case, the PPE increases the degree to which what happens to us depends on our choices.
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Third, we plausibly have interests in being able to restrict access to our good independently of whether it helps us control others' behaviour. Common-sense morality contains a stringent constraint on using others for the sake of goals they don't share.
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What counts as using persons is typically taken to cover using their bodies and property.
However, given the intimate connection between one's self and one's good, it seems reasonable to include the use of another's good within the scope of the constraint. The PPE is thus valuable because it gives us a measure of protection against being wrongfully used as an end in this way. In cases where I don't endorse others' plans to benefit me, this power enables me to morally divest myself from those plans, and prevent my good from Were we to matter only in the latter sense, we would be mere 'receptacles' of value and morality would permit imposing costs on us for the sake of net gains in aggregate wellbeing. In order to properly reflect the fundamental independence of persons, morality must contain constraints on promoting the good (such as rights against harm).
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However, incorporating constraints only partly responds to the separateness-ofpersons/value-receptacle worry. In addition, we need something like the PPE. To help see this, recall the Medicine 1 and Medicine 2 cases discussed above. In each case, Bob is equally protected from being sacrificed for the sake of the greater good: he has (non-absolute) rights that others not infringe his autonomy and bodily integrity. In this respect, morality accommodates Bob's unique perspective with respect to his own life and projects. But under a moral system that lacked the PPE, there would be no deep difference between infringing Bob's rights for the sake of the greater good when the good is constituted by Bob's wellbeing (as in Medicine 1) and when it is constituted by someone else's (as in Medicine 2). Bob would be treated as an interchangeable container of value, in precisely the manner ruled out by a concern for the separateness-of-persons. 55 Our moral status thus grounds the PPE.
Explaining the verdict in Elevator 1
53 This is just a snapshot of a more general form of argument developed in great depth in Owens, Aggressor and commits an additional paternalist wrong against Victim if they do so, by using a moral resource that Victim has authoritatively declared may not be used for that purpose.
One might object that this justification of the consent requirement is undermined by a familiar argument from more general debates about the permissibility of paternalism.
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When confronted with a putatively paternalistic policy that seems both sensible and desirable, a common move in the anti-paternalist's repertoire is to argue that the policy can In response, the first thing to note is that this objection relies on the assumption that victims of aggression lack control over the justice-based reasons for harming aggressors. But this assumption can be contested. As Cécile Fabre has argued in response to a similar objection, "it is not enough to ensure that justice obtains; one must also ensure While we may agree with Shiffrin that our reasons to avoid complicity in exploitation may be sufficiently important to justify failing to enforce an unfair contract, it seems implausible that our reasons to prevent injustice could be weighty enough to justify killing, even if the target is liable. Persons' lives and welfare matter a great deal, independently of whether those interests are protected by rights. This seems especially clear in cases where the aggressor is not fully culpable. My suspicion is that whatever intuitive force this idea has comes from the fact that preventing serious injustice and promoting welfare are typically practically inseparable. But the objection under consideration requires that preventing abstract, impersonal injustice itself is sufficient to justify killing, even if it were not good for anyone. That is a pretty extreme view.
To help see the relative weakness of justice-based reasons in life-or-death contexts, consider the following example:
Rock Rescue: Betty is taking a walk at the bottom of some cliffs, when she spots two rocks falling from the cliff tops. The first rock has been blown by the wind and will land on two innocent persons, killing one and breaking the other's leg. The second rock has been deliberately pushed Villain and will kill a third innocent person. Luckily, Betty has her ray gun with her and has time to vaporise one rock before it lands, but not both.
61
If our reasons to prevent injustice were weighty enough to justify killing, then we should expect to judge that Betty ought to vaporise the second rock and prevent the murder. But it seems clear that instead she ought to vaporise the first rock and prevent the moderately greater harm. 62 As Jeff McMahan puts it, "it would be perverse to prevent the murder rather than the accidental death together with the nonlethal injury." 63 Moreover, even if each boulder only threatened a single life, it is still not obvious that preventing injustice would be important enough justify vaporising the second rock, rather than tossing a coin and giving each victim an equal chance of survival. 64 If our reasons to prevent injustice yield so easily to considerations of welfare and fairness, this strongly suggests that they are insufficiently weighty to justify killing. The justification for preventing unjust aggression is largely grounded in the importance of preventing harm, rather than preventing wrongs.
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We can cast further doubt on the significance of preventing injustice by considering a variation on the Patient case discussed earlier:
Poisoned Patient: Patient has been poisoned by a malicious enemy, and will die unless he receives a blood transfusion. to prevent injustice are insufficient to affect permissibility of saving a life against the beneficiary's will, it is hard to believe that they are important enough to justify killing in contravention of the beneficiary's wishes, even if the target is liable.
There are, however, a limited class of cases in which non-victim-centric reasons may be sufficient to justify harming aggressors, and so permit third-parties to defend victims even in the face of valid refusal. These are cases in which a serious threat to a victim can be averted by imposing a relatively minor harm on the aggressor. 67 For example, if a rescuer can prevent an aggressor from killing her victim by spraining the aggressor's wrist, then it doesn't seem implausible that this harm could be justified by appeal to the value of preventing serious injustice, or even the benefit to the aggressor of not committing a serious moral wrong. 68 If so, then spraining the aggressor's wrist may be permissible even if the victim validly refuses defensive intervention, since the justification would not require appealing to the victim's good. Since it would be a troubling implication of the consentrequirement if it prohibited imposing minor defensive harms on lethal aggressors, I take it to be a virtue of my account that it gives a principled rationale for why there might plausibly be an exception in these cases. 
Explaining the verdict in Elevator 2
The PPE also neatly accounts for the intuitive judgement in cases like Elevator 2. In assessing this case, I propose that we proceed by composition, treating each of the five victims in the same way that we treat the single victim in Elevator 1. This is in line with the broadly liberal/individualist moral outlook endorsed by consent sceptics. The basic 66 I should acknowledge that an anonymous associate editor reports having a less clear intuition about the wrongness of intervention in Poisoned Patient. 67 Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for pressing me to consider these cases. 68 For a detailed discussion of how aggressor-centric reasons may contribute to the justification of defensive harm, see Kimberly Brownlee, 'Acting Defensively for the Sake of Our Attacker' (unpublished manuscript). 69 Interestingly, the rationale for this exception may extend to certain cases of killing, depending on our views about how these justifications for harm grounded in preventing injustice aggregate. For example, imagine a case in which an aggressor threatens to kill 100 innocent victims, who each validly refuse defensive intervention. If we grant that a rescuer would be permitted to inflict a minor defensive harm on the aggressor in order to prevent the injustice of one murder, it is possible that the amount of harm it is permissible to inflict increases with each additional threatened murder, to the point at which it is permissible to kill the aggressor. Though I am open to this idea, its plausibility depends on resolving some extremely difficult issues concerning how harms and injustices aggregate, which I lack the space (and skill) to explore here. Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for raising this possibility.
thought is that the normative consequences that follow from each victim's consent and refusal should not change simply because they are threatened in conjunction with others. 
Consent and Proportionality
With the foregoing analysis of the two cases to hand, we are in a position to see why, contra the sceptics, the consent requirement imposes a significant constraint on defending groups. The key point is that there is a crucial difference between cases like Elevator 1 and Elevator 2, and multiple-victim cases more generally. This is that in many cases (including humanitarian interventions, rebellions, and wars of national-defence) defending victims not only involves harming aggressors (as in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2) but also causing serious harm to innocents. This is significant because, when there are these additional harms, it is not true (as in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2) that each individual victim's good is sufficient to justify the 70 I will consider an important challenge to this assumption in Section 5. 71 Allen Buchanan has recently argued that we should reject the consent requirement in multiple-victim cases, on the ground that basing the requirement in anti-paternalism would, implausibly, require unanimous consent. My account shows that this objection is mistaken. One does not treat others paternalistically simply by acting against their will, but by justifying one's action by appeal to certain reasons: those pertaining to their good or welfare. Since, as I have argued, it is possible to justify defending non-consenting victims without appealing to their good, anti-paternalism does not require unanimous consent (or non-refusal). See Buchanan, 'Self-Determination, Revolution, and Intervention', n.10. and 'The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics of Intervention', p.317.
total amount of harm that would be caused by defending them. Instead, when defence involves collateral killing the number of victims becomes highly morally relevant, due to considerations of proportionality. 72 Putting aside some important complications, the proportionality requirement holds that the relevant goods achieved by a defensive action must be sufficient to outweigh the relevant bad effects that it causes. 73 When those bad effects include killing innocent persons, defence is usually permissible only if it will prevent a significantly greater number of innocent people from being killed. In these cases, the rights of those collaterally killed are justifiably overridden as the 'lesser-evil'. 74 For example, judgements about the standard Trolley Case suggest that a 5:1 ratio between lives saved and innocents killed might be required. At the very least, it would not be proportionate to kill one innocent person as a side-effect in order to save one innocent person from being killed.
Given the proportionality requirement on harming innocents, defensive actions that cause collateral harms are often impermissible, because disproportionate, in virtue of a lack of victims. My contention is that a lack of consenting victims (or, more accurately, a lack of non-refusing victims) can also render defence disproportionate, for precisely the same reason: defence would not achieve sufficient relevant goods to outweigh its relevant bad effects. Just as in Elevator 1 and Elevator 2 discussed above, the central idea is that when victims validly refuse defensive intervention, they thereby exclude their good from the pool of reasons that rescuers may appeal to in order to justify defending them. However, in cases where, unlike Elevator 1 and Elevator 2, the number of victims matters because defence involves killing innocents, the inadmissibility of these reasons may render defensive force disproportionate, depending on the specific facts of the case. If correct, this reveals the sceptical aggregation principle -the Minimal Consent Requirement -to be mistaken. There are many cases in which victims' refusal can make it impermissible to defend a group, even if some (or even many) members explicitly consent to defensive intervention.
To illustrate this, consider a variation on Elevator 2 that involves collateral killing: 
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Elevator 3: Five Victims are taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victims and wishes them dead.
Rescuer is walking by and is able to kill Aggressor by throwing a grenade, thereby saving Victims. However, if she does so, the blast from the grenade will kill Bystander as a side-effect. While one Victim consents to Rescuer's intervention, the four remaining Victims refuse because of their commitment to non-violence.
In this case, I contend, it is impermissible for Rescuer to defend the five Victims, because doing so would be disproportionate. This is despite the fact that saving the five would be permissible, because proportionate, if each of the Victims consented (or did not refuse).
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In essence, on my account, the four Victims' refusal morally converts a case of collaterally killing one in order to save five into a case of collaterally killing one in order to save one.
And saving a single life is not enough to justify killing one innocent person. proportionate to cause that harm. But as the number is reduced, getting closer to that threshold, the proportion of victims that must consent correspondingly increases, potentially to the to the point at which a single refusal would render defence impermissible (this may be true of Elevator 3, for example). My view is thus both weaker and stronger than the Majority Consent Requirement.
The account that I have proposed can be captured more precisely in the following aggregation principle:
The Proportionate Consent Requirement: Other-defence is morally justified only if a sufficient sub-set of the members of the victim group consent to defensive intervention (or do not validly refuse). A sub-set is sufficient if the benefits of defence to the members of the sub-set are sufficient to justify the total amount of morally weighted harm that defending the group will cause.
Here is a slightly more intuitive way of understanding this interpretation of the requirement. Since, on my account, a victim's refusal serves to render the fact that they would benefit inadmissible for the purposes of establishing lesser-evil justifications for harm innocents, there is an important sense in which we can treat victims' refusal as morally equivalent to their non-existence. Given this, one way of determining whether the consent requirement has been met in a particular case is by applying the following counterfactual test: If the (validly) refusing member(s) of a victim group did not exist, would it be permissible to cause the same harm to innocents in order to defend the remaining members? If the answer is no, the consent requirement has not been met and defence is impermissible.
Obligations to Consent? Wrongful Refusal?
A central idea behind the Proportionate Consent Requirement is that we should take each member of a victim group in isolation, so that the normative consequences that follow from each victim's refusal are unaffected by the presence of the other victims. Put differently, we should treat each victim in a multiple-victim case in the same way that we would treat a single victim, and then proceed additively. Given this, one important line of objection to my proposal holds that there is some factor present in multiple-victim cases, absent in single-victim cases, which undermines this moral independence.
Here is one obvious candidate: in multiple-victim cases each victim's decision to refuse defensive intervention may significantly affect other victims' prospects. This is especially salient on my account. Consider the following variation on Elevator 3:
Elevator 3*: Five Victims are taking a ride in an elevator. Aggressor begins to saw through the elevator cable because he hates Victims and wishes them dead.
Rescuer is walking by and is able to kill Aggressor by throwing a grenade, thereby saving Victims. However, if she does so, the blast from the grenade will kill Bystander as a side-effect. Four Victims consent to Rescuer's intervention, while one Victim (let's call him Rafi) refuses because of his commitment to non-violence.
According to the Proportionate Consent Requirement, Rafi's refusal makes it impermissible for Rescuer to defend the group. By exercising his PPE, Rafi reduces the goods available to Rescuer to below the threshold at which she would have a lesser-evil justification for killing the bystander. Rafi's decision is thus a matter of life or death for the remaining four Victims (on the assumption that Rescuer will only defend them if she is morally justified in doing so). This other-regarding feature of multiple-victim cases plausibly undermines the idea that each victim's consent and refusal are morally independent. Instead, we might object that the fact that Rafi's refusal would have serious negative consequences for others places limits on its moral effectiveness.
More precisely, the objection under consideration consists in two distinct claims.
The first is that Rafi would act morally wrongly by refusing defensive intervention. In fact, he is morally required to consent, because doing so will bring about the saving of four consenting victims (by furnishing Rescuer with a justification for defending them) andby hypothesis -we have duties to perform easy rescues. A more plausible line of response is to deny the resource analogy. We may accept that we are subject to rescue duties with respect to our material resources, but deny that we are similarly obligated when it comes to our moral resources. One way to argue for this is to identify differences in the burdensomeness of the two kinds of duty, since duties to assist are typically constrained by the costs to the duty-holder of discharging them. For example, we might hold that requiring a committed pacifist to use his own good in order to bring about killing would involve him acting against his conscience in a particularly egregious way. 79 By contrast, a duty to use one's property to pull non-swimmers from shallow ponds would not. An obvious difficulty for this response, however, it that it 78 For detailed discussion of the connection between duties to aid and the permissibility of using others as a means, see Tadros To help see this, it is useful to think about other ways in which we can use our good to create lesser-evil justifications, other than by consenting to third-party intervention. Consider the following case:
Trolley: Aggressor has set a trolley rolling towards four innocent victims who are tied to the main tracks, because she hates them and wishes them dead.
Rescuer can divert the trolley onto a side-track, thereby saving the four. However, there is an innocent bystander on the side-track who will be killed if she does so. Further down the main track, Barry is crossing the tracks on his way to work and sees events unfolding up the line. While he is crossing, the trolley also threatens his life, but he can avoid being threatened by stepping off the tracks. Second, and more promisingly, we might hold that an individual's claim to defensive intervention is vitiated if they intentionally choose to expose themselves to a threat. If that is true, then Barry's attempting to create a lesser-evil justification for saving the four by stepping onto the tracks would be self-defeating, since it would fail to add an additional claim to be rescued to those of the four. One might object that this is the explanation of why Barry not only lacks a duty but also a moral reason to create a justification for saving the four, which does not apply to involuntary victims such as Rafi. 82 Thanks to an anonymous associate editor for pressing me to consider the following two objections.
Hence, the fact that Barry clearly lacks the relevant reasons does not show that victims of aggression also lack them.
However, we can see that considerations of self-defeat fail to explain Barry's lack of reasons by considering cases in which he can trigger a lesser-evil justification without exposing himself to a threat:
Trolley 2: Aggressor has set a trolley rolling towards four innocent victims who are tied to the main tracks, because she hates them and wishes them dead. Rescuer can divert the trolley onto a side-track, thereby saving the four. However, there is an innocent bystander on the side-track who will be killed if she does so. Barry is passing the tracks on his way to work and sees events unfolding up the line. Jimmy is sound asleep on a nearby bench. Barry is able to gently place Jimmy on the main track without waking him.
Again, Barry clearly has no moral reason to manufacture a justification for saving the four at the cost of the bystander's life. But this is not because it would be self-defeating to try.
Since Jimmy would not have voluntarily placed himself in harm's way his claim to be rescued would be undiminished, and so Rescuer would acquire a justification for diverting the trolley as a result of Barry's action.
One might respond that it would be independently morally wrong for Barry to use Jimmy in this way, and that this explains Barry's lacking reason to perform it so. But this seems to misrepresent the normative situation. In normal cases of wrongfully using someone as an instrument to promote the good, the agent has a perfectly intelligible reason to do so, which is then defeated by the constraint on using others as a means. This doesn't seem true of Barry; he has no such reason in the first place. Using Jimmy wouldn't simply be wrong, it wouldn't make sense.
Putting aside intuitions about particular examples, here is a more general diagnosis of what makes these cases so odd. The objection that victims can be morally obligated to consent, in order to generate justifications for harming the innocent, relies on the idea that we can have moral reasons to alter the balance of moral reasons. This is not always problematic. For example, if Barry could push the innocent bystander off the side-track, thereby removing the moral barrier preventing Rescuer from saving the four, then he seems clearly justified in doing so. But when it comes to altering the balance of reasons in order to bring it about that rights against harm are overridden something has gone seriously wrong.
For if the pre-existing reasons in favour of killing the innocent are insufficiently weighty to justify doing so, how can this generate any reason to add additional considerations in favour of harming to the scales, in order to tip the balance? 83 To claim that there is such a reason requires counting the reasons in favour twice. That's not only irrational, but also involves an objectionable attempt to circumvent the moral constraints that are properly imposed by individuals' basic rights. It is this general failure of practical reasoning, I
contend, that explains why victims have no reason to make their good available to rescuers.
Let me elaborate in the context of Elevator 3*. The idea that Rafi is morally obligated to contribute his good in order to rescue his four co-victims seems compelling when we focus on the claims of the four who are in dire need. But this obscures the crucial fact that the weight of those claims has been fully accounted for in the moral calculus, and found to be defeated by the bystander's claim not to be killed. We therefore cannot -on pain of double-counting -appeal to those claims in order to ground Rafi's obligation to consent, and there are no remaining other-regarding reasons that could do the job. If anything, the claim of the bystander gives Rafi a reason not to consent.
In summary: While we may have duties to help others perform independently justified actions -by using our bodies and property, for example -we do not have reason to do so by manufacturing lesser-evil justifications for their actions. Since the proposed objection to the Proportionate Consent Requirement relies on the claim that we do have such reasons, it should be rejected.
Conclusion: The Ethics of Protest
By way of conclusion, let me sketch how my account of the role of consent in the morality of defensive harm may illuminate some wider practical issues, by looking at the case of political protest.
Acts of public protest can have a variety of aims. In many cases the main goal seems to be indicative, in that the protesters are trying is draw attention to considerations that they believe decisively count against an action or policy. They can be interpreted as (loudly) giving others a report on their interpretation of the facts. But this is not the only function of protest. As well as providing information about the world, protest also seems to have a distinct expressive aim, in that the protesters are trying to communicate an attitude 83 Here is another way of bringing out this contrast, which focuses on our reasons to have certain attitudes, rather than our reasons to act: it seems perfectly reasonable for an uninvolved third-party to regret the presence of the bystander on the side-track in Trolley, who prevents the four from being saved. But it seems very odd to regret the absence of an additional victim on the main-track, whose presence would make it permissible to save the four by killing the bystander.
of personal disapproval towards the object of protest. In addition, the account of consent and refusal that I have sketched suggests that protest may also have a third, transformative function, whereby the act of protest itself counts against the justification of the action or policy being protested. Protesters may be interpreted not simply as giving a report or expressing an attitude, but also as exercising a normative power: the power to withhold their consent to the policy being protested, and thereby prevent the fact that the policy may benefit them from contributing to its justification.
The protests in Britain against the 2003 invasion of Iraq (or at least a slightly idealised version) are a useful case to illustrate this idea. 84 The protesters' rallying cry of "Not in My Name!" can be understood in the indicative, expressive, and transformative senses outlined above. 85 Clearly, one thing the protesters were trying to do was to highlight certain perceived facts about the war -that it lacked a just cause, for example. But the protest also had a self-regarding aspect to it; the protesters were communicating that they did not endorse the war being fought on their behalf. If we treat this as merely expressive, it may seem morally trivial, or even self-indulgent ("It's not all about you!"). However, if
we understand protest as having a transformative function, as I have suggested, it may have considerable moral significance. One of the main justifications given (at least initially)
by the British government for participating in the invasion was that doing so would help protect Britain and its residents from attack by WMDs and terrorist groups harboured by the Iraqi regime. 86 If we interpret the anti-war protesters as exercising a power to withhold consent, one consequence of their protest was to prevent a portion of that putative benefit from contributing to the justification of the invasion. On this view, the existence of protest may itself have made the invasion harder to justify that it otherwise would have been, independently of the other factors that may have counted against it.
